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Highlights  
 This outbreak was contained by extensive contact tracing and proactive isolation 
 These rigorous measures allowed the outbreak end to be declared quickly 
 Less stringent control would have meant lower confidence that the outbreak was over 
 Public vigilance was still required for several weeks after the final case 
 Later identification of the outbreak could have led to more infections 
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Abstract  
Objectives: A hospital-related cluster of 22 COVID-19 cases occurred in Taiwan in January–
February 2021. Rigorous control measures were introduced and could only be relaxed once the 
outbreak was declared over. Each day after the apparent outbreak end, we estimated the risk of 
future cases occurring, to inform decision-making. 
Methods: Probabilistic transmission networks were reconstructed and transmission parameters 
(the reproduction number R and overdispersion parameter k) were estimated. We estimated the 
reporting delay during the outbreak (Scenario 1). We also considered a counterfactual scenario 
with less effective interventions characterized by a longer reporting delay (Scenario 2). Each 
day, we estimated the risk of future cases under both scenarios. 
Results: The values of R and k were estimated to be 1.30 (95% credible interval: 0.57,3.80) and 
0.38 (0.12,1.20), respectively. The mean reporting delays considered were 2.5 days (Scenario 1) 
and 7.8 days (Scenario 2). The inferred probability of future cases occurring declined more 
quickly in Scenario 1 than Scenario 2.  
Conclusions: Following outbreak containment, rigorous control measures allowed the outbreak 
to be declared over quickly. This highlights the need for effective interventions, not only to 
reduce cases during outbreaks but also to allow outbreaks to be declared over with confidence. 
 
Introduction 
As of 9 March 2021, Taiwan had confirmed fewer than 1,000 SARS-CoV-2 infections, of which 
77 were locally acquired (Taiwan Centers for Disease Control, 2021). Following stringent border 
control measures, proactive contact tracing and case isolation, Taiwan’s largest individual 
outbreak to date was a hospital-related outbreak that involved 22 cases and occurred in January-
         
February 2021. Despite successful containment of that outbreak, some aspects were concerning. 
First, the custom of wearing face masks, especially in hospital, was unable to fully prevent 
transmission in several instances (Central Epidemic Command Center, 2021b). Second, the 
source of infection for one of the infected inpatients was undetermined: that individual attended a 
hospital ward that was not included in a so-called ―red zone‖, and he did not interact with other 
detected infected individuals (Central Epidemic Command Center, 2021a). Third, having 
implemented control measures at the time of the first suspected cases, additional cases continued 
to be seen 1–2 weeks afterwards. This led to further investigations into possible causes of the 
outbreak and required an end-of-outbreak determination (i.e., assessment of the probability that 
the outbreak was over—or, conversely, the probability that additional reported cases would occur 
in future) after the last case was reported (Djaafara et al., 2021, Nishiura et al., 2016, Parag et al., 
2020). 
  
Here, we provide a descriptive analysis of the outbreak and quantify viral transmissibility during 
that outbreak. We also present estimates of the probability that additional reported cases would 
occur in future, as obtained in real-time after the final case had been observed. As the time since 
the last observed case increases, the certainty that the outbreak is over increases. We consider 
two distinct scenarios when estimating the probability of future cases. Scenario 1 describes 
containment of the outbreak under intensified contact tracing, as was the situation during this 
outbreak. Under Scenario 1, proactive testing and quarantine of all close contacts of detected 
cases (and suspected cases) after epidemiological investigations was considered, so that cases are 
found quickly and transmission beyond individuals that attended hospital and their contacts was 
unlikely. Scenario 2 describes a situation with reduced contact tracing and testing, increasing the 
         
risk of transmission into the wider community with some chains of transmission potentially 
remaining untraced. In our analysis, these scenarios are assessed by implementing two different 
reporting delays, which represent the time periods from symptom onset to case confirmation. 
The reporting delay under Scenario 1 is shorter than under Scenario 2 due to efficient case 
identification and isolation (Tian et al., 2021). 
 
Materials and Methods 
Outbreak investigation  
A cluster of locally acquired SARS-CoV-2 infections occurred in Taiwan in January–February 
2021. This cluster originated in a hospital and involved 22 reported cases (Figure 1). The first 
two cases to be detected, a doctor (B1.1) and his household and work contact (B1.2), were 
suspected positive and tested on 11 January. They were then confirmed positive the following 
day. The authorities acted proactively by testing their close contacts on 11 January, ordering a 
two-week home isolation of all close contacts, restricting hospital admissions, and arranging for 
a second round of health inspections three days later. Regular press conferences raised public 
awareness and ensured that the local community remained vigilant throughout the outbreak.  
 
The index case (A0) was a Taiwanese female in her 60s who travelled to the United States in 
October 2020 and returned to Taiwan on 27 December 2020. Having tested negative for SARS-
CoV-2 infection within three days before her flight, she developed initial symptoms on 29 
December while in quarantine. She was later hospitalized and was placed on a ventilator. During 
         
her treatment, a doctor (B1.1) was exposed to the virus on 4 January 2021 and experienced initial 
mild symptoms on 8 January. The virus further spread to his household contact B1.2 and other 
medical personnel, most likely due to work-related interactions between B1.1, B2, and B3 on 10 
January. The chains of transmission that followed then included three other work-related 
infections (B4–6), three infections of attending inpatients (C1.1, D1.1, E1) and transmission in 
their households. Household transmission accounted for 12 cases (57%), with the family cluster 
of B4.1 involving all seven family members including one death. In total, two deaths (B4.4, 
D1.1) occurred. 
 
All cases were epidemiologically linked through contact tracing, except for an inpatient (D1.1) 
who had no record of contact with any known infected individual in the hospital. This suggests 
that his infection was likely due to either indirect transmission (e.g. via a contaminated surface 
from a known source) or from an undetected case. The same route of transmission could have 
occurred for infection of B2 by B1.1, since both individuals were wearing masks during their 
interaction (one of which was a highly effective surgical N95 mask). 
 
One individual (C1.2) was pre-symptomatic when testing positive, with onset of symptoms two 
days later. Two infected individuals remained asymptomatic throughout infection. At least one 
pre-symptomatic transmission occurred: a foreign nurse (B6) was exposed to the virus on 7 
January while interacting with B1.1, one day before B1.1 developed symptoms. Unlike the 
family cluster of B4.1, where the secondary attack rate was 100%, the employer of B6 and all his 
family members tested negative despite their close contact with infected case B6. Genetic 
         
sequencing of a subset of cases from the outbreak identified a novel variant Cal.20C (lineage 
B.1.429), originated in Southern California in 2020 (GISAID, 2021, Zhang et al., 2021).  
 
Reconstruction of the transmission network and estimation of the transmission potential  
We characterized the transmission potential of this novel variant by analyzing the offspring 
distribution, which describes the number of secondary infections per primary case. We fitted a 
negative-binomial distribution with mean   and overdispersion parameter k (Riou and Althaus, 
2020). The reproduction number   describes the average number of secondary infections per 
primary case, while   measures variability in the number of secondary infections and quantifies 
the potential for superspreading (which is more likely to occur for lower values of  ).  
 
First, we applied the Wallinga-Teunis (WT) method (Wallinga and Teunis, 2004) to resolve the 
uncertainty in transmission patterns in family clusters by incorporating the serial interval 
distribution from (Nishiura et al., 2020), which is similar to other reported estimates (Biggerstaff 
et al., 2020, Hart et al., 2021). The pairings of infectees to their infectors were known for 12 
secondary cases as a result of epidemiological investigations:        , 
     {                  },          ,               {         }, and      
{       }. We assigned the infection of case D1.1, an inpatient who attended the hospital in the 
first week of the outbreak, to case B1.1, given the timing and that only case B1.1 was 
symptomatic at that time. All other potential infectors (B2, B3, B4.1, B5, and B6) developed 
initial symptoms more than two days after the visit of D1.1 to the hospital (Figure 1).  The 
         
infectors of the other nine cases (excluding the index case A0) were uncertain, with the following 
possibilities: {         }      , {          }      , {              }      , 
{              }      , {              }      , {              }        
{               }      {         }      , and {         }      . Almost all of these 
transmissions (except for infection of case B5) may have been due to household transmission, 
and so exact determination of who-infected-whom is impossible. The infector of case B5 could 
not be identified precisely as that transmission likely occurred in the workplace, where case B5 
contacted multiple possible infectors. Under the WT method, for each of those nine infectees  , 
we selected an infector   from their lists of potential infectors    based on probabilistic sampling. 
The likelihood that case   (with symptoms onset at time   ) infected case  , relative to the 
likelihood that any other potential infector infected case  , was given by: 
     
          {       } 
∑           {       }     
  (1) 
where       {       }  represents the serial interval distribution modeled by a Weibull 
distribution with the mean             days (i.e.               ) and shape parameter 
            (Nishiura et al., 2020). 
 
Second, we determined the number of transmissions from each primary case in any probabilistic 
realization of the transmission network. We fitted a negative binomial probability mass function 
to each resulting distribution, with mean   and overdispersion parameter  . 
 
         
Generation-based reproduction number 
The reconstructed transmission networks allowed us to make a probabilistic assignment of 
generation membership to cases and derive the generation-based reproduction number,    
(Akhmetzhanov et al., 2018, Worden et al., 2020). Given a particular network, each node (i.e. 
each case) was assigned to a generation , where the value of  represents the number of links 
from that node to the index case A0. The node A0 was placed at the root of the network and 
assigned to generation 0. To derive the generation-based reproduction number,   , we divided 
the number of transmissions generated by cases in generation  by the number of cases in that 
generation. Hence, the reproduction number for the final generation  (     was exactly 
zero. The reproduction number for generation zero was equal to one.  Because the transmission 
networks were generated probabilistically, each    was also characterized by a posterior 
distribution.   
 
Estimation of the reporting delay 
Fitting the reporting delay distribution with a mixture of three shifted distributions (gamma, 
Weibull, and lognormal), we estimated the mean reporting delay for this outbreak (under the 
intensive measures that were in place for this outbreak – Scenario 1). We also considered a 
counterfactual scenario (Scenario 2) in which public health measures are less rigorous. Rather 
than attempting to model the wide range of possible effects of less rigorous contact tracing and 
case isolation, in Scenario 2 we simply set the reporting delay to be longer than in Scenario 1. In 
Scenario 2, we set the mean reporting delay by estimating its value using data for all local cases 
reported in Taiwan since the beginning of 2020. 
         
 
Specifically, for each scenario, we extracted data describing dates of symptoms onset and 
confirmation for all symptomatic cases. The number of extracted cases was      for Scenario 
1 and      for Scenario 2. The likelihood was given by a mixture of three component 
likelihoods with respective weights    (          and right truncation at the time of the latest 
update  : 
       {  }  ∑    
        {  } 
  {     }
  (2) 
  
        {  }  ∏
          
            
 
     
 (3) 
where          is the time difference between confirmation    and symptom onset    for case 
 . Because the extracted data contained only the dates of symptom onset    and confirmation   , 
we assumed that the priors for the times of symptom onset    and confirmation    were 
uniformly distributed within those days:               and              . Some 
observed    were negative, so that the reporting delay distributions were modeled by either 
shifted gamma, Weibull, or lognormal distributions (       ). The function            denoted 
the probability density function (PDF): 
           {     }               
                  (4) 
where   is the shift of distribution   (   ),   and   are the mean and standard deviation of the 
distribution  . To improve the convergence of the mixture model, we assumed that parameters 
{     } were common to the three distributions, as has been proposed elsewhere for Bayesian 
         
model averaging (Akhmetzhanov, 2021, Keller and Kamary, 2018).             denoted the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF). The truncation time   was set to 12 April 2021. 
 
The relative weightings of the different component distributions   were defined using the 
formula: 
    
   
        {  } 
      {  } 
  (5) 
 
End-of-outbreak probability 
On a given day, to estimate whether or not the outbreak was already over, we used a previously 
described method devised by Linton et al. (Linton et al., 2021). First, we considered the 
epidemic curve up to the time of report   with dates of symptom onsets      for all 
symptomatic cases      . The probability that one or more new cases will be reported after 
day   is defined by the following expression: 
              ∏∑  [       ]
 
 
   
 
   
  (6) 
In this expression,      is the number of cases reported on day   and    is the probability of   
transmissions occurring from a primary case  , which follows a negative binomial distribution 
with mean   and overdispersion parameter   as described above. The function         
represents the CDF for the probability that an individual infected by case   reports infection by 
time  . This function is therefore the CDF of a convolution of the serial interval and the reporting 
         
delay. For each potential infectee, the reporting delay was selected at random from the three 




R 4.1.0 (R Development Core Team, 2021) and CmdStan 2.27.0 (Stan Development Team, 
2021) were used to conduct the main analysis; Python 3.6 was used for statistical inference of the 
generation-based reproduction number. Reproducible code for this study is available on GitHub 
at https://github.com/aakhmetz/Taiwan-COVID19-end-of-outbreak-JanFeb2021. All derived 
estimates of model parameters and the results of sensitivity analyses can also be found in 
Supplementary Materials (Supplementary Tables 1–2, Supplementary Figures 1–3). 
 
Results 
Our statistical inference of the offspring distribution identified the median   estimate to be 1.30 
(95% credible interval (CI): 0.57, 3.80) and median   estimate to be 0.38 (95% CI: 0.12, 1.20). 
The generation-based reproduction number (i.e., the expected number of transmissions arising 
from an infector in a specific generation of the transmission chain, where patient A0 represents 
generation 0) declined throughout the outbreak from generation 1 onwards. In generation 1, the 
generation-based reproduction number was estimated to be 6, falling below 1 by generation 3 
(Supplementary Figures 4–5; Supplementary Table 2). Inspection of probabilistic transmission 
networks (Supplementary Figure 6) confirmed a high value of the case reproduction number, R, 
         
for B1.1, but also supported sequential transmission of the virus within households resulting in a 
greater estimated value of   compared to earlier studies (Bi et al., 2020, Endo et al., 2020, 
Nakajo and Nishiura, 2021). A previous study by Ng et al. (Ng et al., 2020) involved an analysis 
of data from Taiwan from 2020, and found an estimated value of   that was substantially larger, 
in part due to the small sample size in their analysis (the posterior mean of   was 19.20). 
 
We estimated the mean reporting delay for the outbreak (under the intensive measures that were 
in place for this outbreak – Scenario 1) to be 2.5 days (95% CI: 1.8, 3.5) with standard deviation 
(SD) 1.6 days (95% CI: 1.1, 2.9). Under counterfactual Scenario 2, where we instead estimated 
the mean reporting delay for all local cases reported in Taiwan since the beginning of 2020, the 
mean reporting delay was 7.8 days (95% CI: 6.2, 10.1) with SD 7.8 days (95% CI: 5.7, 13.2). 
Because of a small number of negative delays (i.e. some individuals were detected prior to 
developing symptoms), the distributions were shifted approximately 1 day earlier as a result of 
the model fitting (1.0 day (95% CI: 0.2, 2.9) for Scenario 1 and 0.8 days (95% CI: 0.1, 2.0) for 
Scenario 2). The observed difference in mean reporting delays between Scenario 1 and Scenario 
2 can be attributed to different ways in which cases were detected. Under Scenario 1, cases were 
detected quickly by contact tracing, whereas under Scenario 2 cases were detected by both 
contact tracing and symptom-based surveillance (Bi et al., 2020).  
 
Incorporating the posterior distributions for      the serial interval (Nishiura et al., 2020) and the 
reporting delay in the formula for the end-of-outbreak probability (equation (6)), following the 
final case reported in this outbreak we observed a sharper decline in the estimated probability 
that new cases will be reported in future under Scenario 1 than Scenario 2 (green and black lines 
         
and regions in Figure 2). Ten days after the last reported case, on 19 February this probability 
(reported here as a percentage) dropped to 24.7% under Scenario 1 compared to 79.7% under 
Scenario 2. Depending on the policy-maker’s ―acceptable risk‖, different thresholds in this 
probability could be chosen before declaring an outbreak over (Thompson et al., 2019). For 
instance, if a threshold of 10% is chosen, the outbreak could have been declared over on 24 
February under Scenario 1 compared to a later date of 18 March under Scenario 2. Sensitivity 
analyses are presented for different values of   and  , as well as different reporting delay 
distributions for Scenario 2, in the Supplementary Material, indicating qualitatively similar 
results. In each case, more rigorous control measures (characterized by a shorter reporting delay) 
allow policy-makers to be confident that the outbreak is over sooner after the final reported case. 
 
Conclusions 
In summary, our results suggest that the rigorous public health measures that were in place 
allowed the outbreak end to be declared around three weeks earlier than if these intensive 
measures were not introduced. Stringent control measures allowed policy-makers to be confident 
that the epidemic was over earlier compared to a scenario with less intense measures. However, 
even with strict control measures, public vigilance was required for 2–3 weeks after the final 
reported case until total confidence that the outbreak was over was achieved (Figure 2). 
 
We conclude that proactive countermeasures and high public compliance contributed to efficient 
containment and a high confidence that the hospital-related outbreak in Taiwan was over by mid-
February 2021. We note that later identification of the outbreak could have led to larger number 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of exposure and possible connections between reported cases. Connections 
shown here were determined either by identifying the most probable infector via epidemiological 
investigation or by the earliest time of symptom onset among all close contacts if the most likely 




         
 
Figure 2. The estimated risk of cases being reported in future for Scenario 1 (under intensified 
contact tracing; green) and Scenario 2 (less rigorous public health measures; black). Bars in 
orange indicate the incidence of COVID-19 by confirmation date. 
 
 
         
